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Security was the key concern for the
region in the year 2 0 0 0 in the wake of
coups in Fiji and the Solomon Islands,
b u rgeoning demands for independence
in West Papua, and continuing efforts
to find a lasting political settlement on
Bougainville. These political and secu-
rity crises are examined individually.
The timeliness and efficacy of the
response by Australia, the regional
heavyweight, and by the Forum is
then assessed. Finally a broad com-
parison of regional crises is under-
taken to ascertain whether any trends
are emerging with respect to the role
of ethnicity and other factors in caus-
ing conflict, as well as to illuminate
ways to deter the resort to illegal
means, including violence, to achieve
political ends. First, however, is an
update on efforts to promote environ-
mental dimensions of security, notably
the coordinated management of
regional fisheries and the latest out-
come in i n t e rnational eff o rts to com-
bat climate change.
The negotiation process known as
the Multilateral High Level Confer-
ence for Conservation and Manage-
ment of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
was launched in 1997 and concluded
with a convention open to signature
on 5 September 2000 after its seventh
and final session in Honolulu. All six-
teen Forum Fisheries Committee mem-
bers attended, as did France and the
French territories and the eight dis-
tant-water fishing nations. The quest
to adopt the convention by consensus
proved impossible and it was finally
put to a vote with 19 in favor, 2
against ( Japan and South Korea), 
and 3 abstentions (China, France, and
Tonga). It was subsequently signed 
by 11 states and ratified by Fiji.
Japan, in part i c u l a r, was dissatisfied
with numerous aspects of the final
draft, including the boundaries of the
convention area and decision-making
procedures that Japan considered
discriminatory against the minority,
namely Asian distant-water fishing
nations. In the end a compromise for-
mula was adopted in which chambers
of Forum and non-Forum members of
the proposed commission would each
need to support a decision by a three-
fourths majority in order for it to
pass. This would provide decisions
with sufficient clout to implement
them but also prevent individual
countries from exercising veto power.
To address widely held concerns that
France would secure more votes for
itself by virtue of its three territories,
it was decided that separate rules of
procedure be drawn up to specify the
extent of participation by overseas
territories.
Finalizing the convention is a
major step in formalizing cooperation
between the Pacific Islands and dis-
tant-water fishing nations over sus-
tainable fisheries management. How-
ever, it is just the beginning of a long
and challenging process to implement
the agreement. In the short term, deci-
sions must be reached on the location
of the permanent headquarters of the
commission. Entry into force then
re q u i res ratification by 3 d i s t a n t - w a t e r
fishing nations and 7 coastal states,
or, if after three years enough distant-
water fishing nations have not ratified,
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with 12 ratifications. Realistically, the
convention will not work without the
majority of the distant-water fishing
nations supporting it, and northeast
A s i an p a rt i c i p a t i on s t i ll re m a i ns d o u b t-
ful. Financing the commission is also
a vexed issue, as those distant-water
fishing nations that ratify are loath to
bear a disproportionate burden. Com-
pliance and enforcement provisions
constitute one of the biggest tasks for
the future commission, especially with
respect to those that do not ratify.
Equally demanding is the commis-
sion’s crucial role in determining how
to allocate fishing opportunities and
how to accommodate the entry of
new distant-water fishing nations. 
Notwithstanding the challenges
facing implementation, the Conven-
tion for the Conservation and Man-
agement of Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks is a remarkable achievement. 
“It includes the large interlocking e e zs
of the Pacific Islands, as well as vast
s t retches of high seas. . . . opport u n i-
ties [have been] created through the
convention to manage and conserv e
the highly valuable, as well as highly
m i g r a t o ry, fish stocks of the western
and central Pacific. The convention
also provides a framework and foru m
for the resolution of conflicts between
the fishing nations and coastal states
of the region. . . . the convention is an
i m p o rtant step towards fulfilling the
legally prescribed, yet politically
fraught, duty to cooperate” as laid
down by the United Nations (Ta rt e
2 0 0 0b ) .
News on the environment was not
all positive for the Pacific Islands, with
a disappointing setback in eff o rts to
combat global warming. In Novem-
b e r, after two weeks of intense negoti-
ations in the Hague, the Sixth Confer-
ence of Parties to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change
(u n f c c c) suspended talks without
reaching agreement on ways to opera-
tionalize the 1 9 9 7 Kyoto Protocol. In
Kyoto, developed countries had com-
mitted themselves to greenhouse-gas
reductions averaging 5.2 percent from
the base year of 1990 by 2012 (see
von Strokirch 1998). The conference
made progress toward outlining a
package of financial support and tech-
nology transfer to help developing
countries contribute to global action
on climate change. But the key politi-
cal issues—including an international
emissions trading system, a “clean
development mechanism,” the rules
for counting emissions reductions
from carbon “sinks,” and a compli-
ance regime—could not be resolved
(u n f c c c, 2000).
The talks failed due to a deadlock
between the European Union (EU)
and the United States–led umbrella
group comprising Australia, Canada,
and Japan over how to translate the
principles of the 1997 protocol into
action. In particular they disagreed
over the definition of carbon sinks,
such as greenhouse-gas-absorbing
trees, and the extent to which coun-
tries could use these to offset their
greenhouse-gas emissions. The
umbrella group wanted the definition
of sinks broadened and also sought 
to expand the scope for countries to
purchase the unused emission rights
or carbon credits of other countries.
The E u ropean Union strongly opposed
both these moves because they
amounted to loopholes that would
allow developed countries to avoid
honoring their stated commitments 
to real cuts in emissions (A u s t r a l i a n ,
27, 2 8 Nov 2 0 0 0) .
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Although the United States had
agreed to emission cuts in Kyoto, in
the intervening period it has evidently
realized the enormity of the challenge
to meet that obligation. United States
participation in the UN framework
convention is crucial, because it emits
almost a quarter of global greenhouse
gases despite having only 4 percent of
the world’s population. The confer-
ence has agreed to resume talks in
mid-2001, but agreement may be
harder to reach in view of the election
of the conservative Bush administra -
tion in the United States. Despite the
best efforts of intergovernmental
organizations such as the Forum and
the Alliance of Small Island States and
nongovernment organizations that
lobbied hard for a meaningful out-
come in the Hague, the immediate
outlook is somewhat bleak.
Pacific Island states are among the
world’s nations most vulnerable to
extreme weather events. A new report
by the World Bank describes the
impacts as including loss of coastal
infrastructure and land, more intense
cyclones and droughts, failure of sub-
sistence crops and coastal fisheries,
losses in coral reefs, and the spread 
of malaria and dengue fever. Many of
these trends are already in evidence.
The study identified and re c o m m e n d e d
a series of “adaptation strategies” for
the Pacific Islands to offset the impact
of global warming. These could
include better management of natural
resources, disease vector control, and
improved spatial planning. In the
absence of adaptation the report
estimated that the high island of Viti
Levu in Fiji could incur damages of
us$23–52 million a year by 2050,
equivalent to 2–4 percent of Fiji’s
current gross domestic product. How-
ever, the World Bank recognized that
the microstates require financial assis-
tance in implementing these strategies
and has called on the international
community to act urgently to help
countries on the receiving end of cli-
mate change (World Bank, 2000).
Despite the long-term significance
of economic and environmental
dimensions of security, these were
completely overshadowed by the secu-
rity crises that erupted in the year
2000. Fiji was in turmoil after the
government’s overthrow in a coup 
on 19 May, exactly one year after the
election of the People’s Coalition gov-
ernment. The initial tactics bore simi-
larities to the May 1987 coup, as
armed men stormed parliament and
took the government hostage. The
rhetoric of the coup-makers was heav-
ily laced with references to Fijian
nationalism. However, this time the
usurper was not a soldier, nor was he
a person of any chiefly or political
status. George Speight was a failed
businessman who bore a grudge
against the government for sacking
him from his directorship of a major
timber firm and for charging him with
corruption. Moreover, this seizure of
power featured a higher level of
intimidation and violence in the wider
community and in parliament. The
hostage crisis dragged on for fifty-six
days as Speight and his men issued
threats against their captives unless
their demands were met. Although
several army personnel assisted
Speight, the armed forces as a whole
were not involved in the coup. Never-
theless, they seemed unable to prevent
the ensuing public disorder, which
had serious consequences as mobs
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took to the streets on the first day,
looting and burning shops in the
capital, Suva. 
Just as in 1987, this coup ousted 
a legitimate, broadly representative
government. The 1999 elections were
held under the auspices of the 1997
constitution, which itself was the
product of extensive public consul-
tation, and endorsed by the Gre a t
Council of Chiefs and both houses of
parliament. Once again it was a gov-
ernment dominated by the Labor
Party, with substantial Indo-Fijian
participation in the cabinet line-up.
However, this time a significant differ-
ence in the eyes of many indigenous
Fijians was that the prime minister,
Mahendra Chaudhry, was an Indo-
Fijian. Chaudhry, a former trade
union leader, had begun to implement
ambitious reforms. In doing so, he
was perceived by some as being arro-
gant and insensitive to indigenous
Fijian concerns, particularly with
regard to the process of issuing or
renewing native land leases. Fijian
nationalists began to mount a series of
peaceful protests against Chaudhry’s
government, including a three-thou-
sand-strong march that was underway
as the coup took place.
Despite the democratic credentials
of the Chaudhry government and the
unlawful behavior of the hostage tak-
ers, within a week President Ratu Sir
Kamisese Mara and the Great Council
of Chiefs had caved in to most of
Speight’s demands. They evidently
concurred with his view that the 1997
constitution was flawed and a new
one, more sensitive to indigenous
Fijian concerns, was needed. Chaud-
hry’s government was asked to resign
and Speight’s men were to be granted
amnesty for their actions. Embold-
ened by his power, Speight rejected
the offer made by the Great Council
of Chiefs and upped the ante with
further demands, including the resig -
nation of Ratu Mara and the appoint-
ment of a new president and a gov-
ernment designated by Speight. As the
internal security situation worsened,
the army asked the president to stand
aside, abrogated the constitution, and
declared martial law on 29 May. The
hostages were finally released on 13
July, but only after the Great Council
of Chiefs had endorsed Speight’s
choice for president, Ratu Josefa
Iloilo, the former vice-president. The
new president then appointed an
interim administration led by Laisenia
Qarase (P N B, July 2000, 2).
After his appointment in July,
Qarase quickly developed a blueprint
to implement affirmative action poli-
cies for indigenous Fijians. He also
proposed that a new constitution
secure Fijian paramountcy in politics
and reserve the heads of state and
government for indigenous Fijians. A
Constitution Review Commission was
set up to consult with the public and
develop a draft constitution. In a land-
mark ruling on 15 November, High
Court Judge Anthony Gates ruled that
the military had no right to appoint
the interim administration, which is
therefore illegal, and that the 1997
constitution had not been abrogated.
He added that all those elected in the
Chaudhry government were still
members of parliament. The interim
government’s appeal on this decision
will be heard in February 2001. There
are fears that the interim administra-
tion could ignore the final court rul-
ing on the purported grounds of pro-
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moting national security. In its final
word on the subject in 2000, the
Qarase administration promised it
would hold a democratic election by
March 2002 (P N B, Jan 2001, 10–11).
Events in the latter half of 2000
demonstrated that the general climate
of insecurity did not end with the
hostage drama. Speight and his men
had been granted amnesty for acts
committed during the crisis on the
proviso that they lay down their arms
and show due respect for the law.
Instead, they continued to foment
unrest after the hostage release,
prompting the military to launch a
raid on 27 July and arrest the mili-
tants. They were charged with treason
and imprisoned, though some of the
military personnel were later released.
(It remains to be seen when or even
whether a trial for Speight and the
ringleaders will be held.) The violence
did not end there, as recently freed
Speight supporters within the military
launched an act of mutiny at the bar-
racks on 2 November that was quickly
put down by the Fiji Military Forces.
Eight soldiers were killed and scores
injured in an incident that put paid to
any hopes of a speedy return to law
and order. In the rural areas Indo-
Fijians were subjected to looting, dam-
age to homes and shops, and other
acts of terror by Fijians sympathetic
to Speight’s rhetoric on Fijian rights
and the use of force to reclaim them.
The military finally lifted roadblocks
and the all-night curfew in Suva on
15 December, based on their convic-
tion that stability had returned to Fiji.
Nevertheless, the Emergency Security
Decree was to remain in place until
further notice.
In what was touted by the media
as a copycat phenomenon, the conflict
in the Solomon Islands culminated 
in a coup of sorts on 5 June. The
Malaita Eagle Force (m e f) and Malai-
tan members of the Royal Solomon
Islands Police ousted the government
of Bartholomew Ulufa‘alu. The par-
liament subsequently elected a new
government led by Manasseh Soga-
vare. The crisis had its origins in long-
standing ethnic tensions that turned
violent in late 1998. Frustration with
the failure of successive governments
to address the concerns of Guadal-
canal Islanders prompted youths to
take up arms against immigrants 
from the island of Malaita. People of
Guadalcanal resented Malaitans for
alienating land and for dominating
commerce and government jobs, par-
ticularly in and around Honiara. By
late 1999 the Isatabu Freedom Move-
ment (i f m) had forced some 20,000
Malaitans to flee Guadalcanal.
Repeated confrontations between the
movement and the police throughout
1999 left several i f m militants dead
(Kabutaulaka 2000a, 5–7).
Two peace accords negotiated by
the government with the help of a
Commonwealth envoy had collapsed
by late 1999, in part because the
cash-strapped government was unable
to meet demands from both sides for
financial compensation. Malaitan mil-
itants then formed the Malaita Eagle
Force and in January raided a police
station for guns to fight the Isatabu
Freedom Movement. Their aims were
to seek compensation for loss of
property and killings of Malaitans
and to ensure protection of remaining
Malaitan interests in Honiara, which
became a Malaitan enclave. After the
government’s overthrow in June,
political reviews • the region 515
fighting between the two groups in
Honiara intensified, with the police
unable to prevent the descent into
lawlessness. Many police sided with
the militants. On 2 August a ceasefire
was brokered but it was not honored
due to bad faith on both sides. By the
end of the year it was estimated that
over 100 people had died as a result
of the conflict.
On 15 October the two warring
parties signed the Townsville Peace
Agreement after six days of negotia-
tions hosted by Australia and facili-
tated with the help of New Zealand.
The agreement covered a wide range
of sensitive and complex issues,
including national security and war
claims, loss of lives and property,
political and socioeconomic issues,
reconciliation, peace monitoring, and
a declaration of peace and harmony.
The question of amnesty was contro-
versial, because militants sought
immunity from prosecution for vio-
lence and other crimes perpetrated
during the conflict. Ultimately it was
agreed that amnesty would be granted
if the conditions of the agreement
were met. Within a specified time the
militants undertook to disband road-
blocks and bunkers; return their
weapons; and to locate, identify, and
allow relatives to retrieve the remains
of victims. The two parties also agre e d
to renounce violence and settle their
differences peacefully with respect for
the rule of law. As a consequence of
the agreement unarmed Australian
and New Zealand police arrived in
November to monitor the peace and
supervise the disarmament process
(Kabutaulaka 2000b, 4–5).
Significantly, the Townsville Peace
Agreement went beyond the parame-
ters of the original Malaita-Guadal-
canal dispute by advocating a more
decentralized political system in the
Solomon Islands to give provinces
greater autonomy, notably in terms of
their control over natural resources.
An earlier national peace conference
held in late August had also empha-
sized the need for changes to the sys-
tem of government to redress griev-
ances over the poor distribution of
resources between different provinces,
between the central government and
provinces, and between rural and
urban areas. More equitable develop-
ment across the nation was seen to be
a way of deterring mass migration
(especially to the capital) which had
been a key contributing factor to the
two-year ethnic conflict. In addition,
the alienation of land from traditional
owners and the extent of compensa-
tion for its loss have been major issues
that must be addressed. Both the
a g reement and the peace confere n c e
also highlighted the need for a re s t ru c-
turing of the police, with a view to
p roducing a neutral and pro f e s s i o n a l
police force (P N B, Sept 2 0 0 0, 4–5) .
The conflict in the Solomon Islands
is a result of long-standing grievances
based on socioeconomic disparities
between ethnic groups. Such griev-
ances were compounded by the poor
economic management of successive
governments and their failure to
address the root causes of disputes.
Yet the government’s past lack of
action is understandable insofar as
issues involving the redistribution 
of land, jobs, and wealth are hardly
amenable to a quick or cheap fix and
must be subject to protracted negotia-
tions between all stakeholders. The
provision of compensation is further
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stymied by the nation’s parlous eco-
nomic situation and the government’s
continuing cash-flow problem. Aus-
tralia has signaled a preparedness to
partly finance a solution provided the
terms of the peace agreement are
fulfilled. There is considerable good-
will in the Solomon Islands to make
the peace process work, especially
among nongovernment organizations.
However, at the close of 2000 roughly
half the weapons had not been sur-
rendered, despite the expiration of the
amnesty. The peace remains tenuous
until this minimal condition is met.
The initial regional response to the
rapidly unfolding crises in Fiji and the
Solomon Islands was widely perceived
as weak and ineffectual, and perhaps
complicated because the Forum secre-
tariat is based in Suva. In contrast to
the Forum’s inaction, the Common-
wealth sent its secretary general, Don
McKinnon, to lobby for the release 
of the captive government. Once the
hostages had been freed, Australia,
New Zealand, other Commonwealth
countries, and the European Union
cranked up diplomatic pressure and
rhetoric about the need for a speedy
restoration of constitutional democ-
racy in Fiji, the holding of democratic
elections, and for Speight and his men
to be held to account for their actions.
The Commonwealth formed a Minis-
terial Action Group, which sent a
mission to Fiji and later appointed a
special envoy to continue their cam-
paign to restore democracy and pro-
mote national unity there. The Euro-
pean Union and the Africa,
Caribbean, and Pacific group also sent
a fact-finding mission to Fiji and the
Solomon Islands. A final decision on
sanctions had not been made by the
end of the year.
Soon after the hostage crisis was
over, Australia and New Zealand
jointly developed and instituted a
series of what have been termed
“smart sanctions” against Fiji. These
were targeted to damage the regime
rather than inflict additional pain on
the poor, who were already suffering
f rom the economic fallout of the coup.
Australia recalled its high commis-
sioner, terminated non-humanitarian
aid (which equaled 30 percent of the
aid program), suspended military
cooperation, and banned sporting
contacts. Cooperation under the Aus-
tralia-Fiji Trade and Economic Rela-
tions Agreement was also suspended,
but Australia continued assistance to
the Fiji clothing industry under the
transitional s pa rt e c a - t c f scheme
once the interim government agreed
to hold elections in March 2002. That
assistance would also be jeopardized
if the interim government disregarded
a decision by the Fiji courts that the
1997 constitution still stands
(Downer 2000).
In the year under review many
regional media commentators and
politicians began to question the
future role and viability of both the
Pacific Islands Forum and the Melane-
sian Spearhead Group if they proved
incapable of coordinating strategies to
resolve regional conflicts. The main
activity on the part of the Forum was
a flurry of meetings throughout the
year to discuss better ways of coordi-
nating effective regional responses 
to political and security crises. In the
first instance, an academic was com-
missioned by the Forum Secretariat 
to analyze the nature and causes of
internal conflicts in regional nations
and to make recommendations on
ways in which the Forum could pre-
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vent conflict breaking out or, failing
that, play a timely role in brokering
peace.
In his report, Ron Crocombe con-
cluded that “the main instances of
overt conflict in the past twenty years
have involved a combination of ethnic
tensions (whether among Pacific
Islanders or between Islanders and
immigrants), land disputes, economic
disparities and a lack of confidence in
government’s ability or willingness to
solve the problems.” He maintained
that economic problems and poor
quality governance are frequently the
trigger for ethnic tensions and land
disputes. Overall, he argued that these
issues merit more attention well before
a security breakdown occurs, but gov-
ernments tend to avoid addressing
them directly because they are politi-
cally “sensitive,” while potential solu-
tions are complex and slow to pro-
duce results. Crocombe observed that
there was usually little scope for pre-
ventive diplomacy in internal conflicts
because governments to date have
been reluctant to invite external
involvement until after a conflict 
has erupted. Apart from supporting
long-term national efforts to improve
social welfare and equity, he therefore
emphasized the scope for the Forum
to facilitate conflict resolution
(Crocombe, 2000).
The Forum Regional Security
Committee met in Port Vila from 13
to 15 July and accepted many of Cro-
combe’s assessments. They also devel-
oped numerous practical recommen-
dations for conflict resolution and
forwarded them for consideration at
the annual Forum heads of govern-
ment meeting. Forum economic min-
isters also met from 24 to 25 July, in
Niue, where discussions included calls
for greater community consultation
on economic reform, the institution of
policies to minimize economic dispari-
ties, and attention to unresolved land
issues. All of these measures were
proposed with the aim of preventing
political unrest of the kind recently
witnessed in the region. The Forum
F o reign Affairs Ministers Meeting was
held in Apia from 10 to 11 August to
discuss assistance for post-conflict res-
olution efforts and economic recovery
in Fiji and the Solomon Islands. The
meeting also considered ways to aug-
ment the 1997 Aitutaki Declaration
by the adoption of guidelines and
mechanisms to act on re q u e s t s f o r
assistance in a crisis w h e re Forum
principles have been violated. Like the
Forum Regional Security Committee,
the foreign ministers recommended to
the Forum meeting that leaders com-
mit themselves to a number of fun-
damental principles and courses of
action with respect to regional secu-
rity (p i f 2000).
In a speech in September, Forum
Secretary General Noel Levi presented
a synthesis of the collective views of
Forum members on regional conflicts
that deplored the use of force to bring
about change in governments, sought
the restoration of constitutional
democracy, asked the international
community to respond in ways that
did not penalize innocent victims—
including other Forum countries that
use Fiji and the Solomon Islands as
transshipment ports—and expressed 
a desire to support the efforts of Fiji
and the Solomon Islands in returning
to democratic government and nor-
malcy through close cooperation and
consultation. Nevertheless, he main-
tained that the Forum should “essen-
tially leave it to Fiji and the Solomon
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Islands to resolve their crises.” This
last point was reinforced later in the
speech, when Levi concluded that the
Forum’s “strength lies in its consensus
decision making philosophy and its
non-interference in members’ internal
domestic affairs principle” (Levi
2000, paragraphs 11, 20). This
approach has the merit of constrain-
ing bigger powers like Australia from
imposing their agenda; however, the
as e a n experience has shown that
consensus and noninterference foster
a reluctance to address sensitive issues
and thereby hinder multilateral secu-
rity initiatives.
By the time heads of government
met at the annual Forum, held in
Tarawa 27 to 30 October, a tenuous
peace had been established in the
Solomon Islands thanks to the Towns-
ville agreement. Regional leaders
therefore restricted themselves to con-
gratulating parties to the agreement
and urging the international and
regional communities “to give the
peace process every encouragement
including by contributing to Solomon
Islands’ urgent security, rehabilitation
and development needs” (pif 2000).
By contrast, in Fiji the situation was
far from being resolved satisfactorily.
Deposed Prime Minister Chaudhry
had earlier pleaded with the Com-
monwealth, and by extension the
international community, not to rec-
ognize the interim government, which
he identified as being not only illegiti-
mate, but as promoting a racist and
undemocratic agenda (Chaudhry
2000). Tupeni Baba made a similar
appeal to the Forum and asked mem-
bers to collectively lobby for reinstate-
ment of the 1997 constitution and
f o rmation of a government of national
unity comprising parties from across
the political spectrum (Baba 2000).
Instead, in the Forum’s final commu-
niqué, leaders “welcomed the effort
and commitment to date by the Fiji
interim government to return the
country to constitutional democracy.”
This limited statement was not accom-
panied by any inducements or sanc-
tions to exert influence on the interim
government of Fiji.
After being absent from the previ-
ous two Forums, Australian Prime
Minister John Howard evidently con-
sidered the deterioration in regional
security warranted his input at the
Tarawa Forum. Australia presented 
a series of proposals with respect to
regional security, including a major
extension of the Pacific Patrol Boat
program. Australia also tabled a pro-
posal to restrict the possession and
build-up of arms in the Pacific and
recommended that a task force be
established to draft national weapons
control legislation. Significantly, Aus-
tralia called for closer cooperation
with the Commonwealth Secretariat,
which, in keeping with Australia’s
own policy, had been more assertive
than the Forum in pressing for the
restoration of democracy in Fiji. The
Commonwealth has a staged process
for suspending the participation of
members if they violate democratic
principles. Fiji’s membership lapsed
after the 1987 coups because it
became a republic, and it was not
readmitted until 1997 following the
adoption of a democratic constitution.
After the 2000 coup it was suspended
from the Commonwealth Council. It
is likely Australia wanted to see simi-
lar procedures introduced in the
Forum, but Melanesian resistance,
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including fierce lobbying by Fiji,
ensured this did not eventuate (P N B,
Nov 2000, 1–3).
Leaders at the Forum acknowl-
edged the urgent need to address the
fundamental causes of political insta-
bility in the region—identified by
Crocombe as ethnic tension, inequity,
poor governance, and land disputes—
though they added “the erosion of
cultural values” as another contribut-
ing factor. They also sought the devel-
opment of long-term peace-building
programs in the region to address
potential threats to security and called
on the Commonwealth and the United
Nations to assist in this regard, but
the nature of such programs was
unspecified. In recognition of the
broader need for a mechanism to
respond in a timely and effective fash-
ion to future political and security
crises in the region, leaders adopted
the Biketawa Declaration, which was
the culmination of reports and recom-
mendations made during the year by
Crocombe, the Commonwealth Secre-
tariat, the Forum Regional Security
Committee, the Forum Economic
Ministers Meeting, and the Forum
Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting,
and was a framework strongly advo-
cated by Australia.
The key guiding principles of the
Biketawa Declaration include commit-
ments to good governance; liberty of
the individual; democratic processes
that reflect national and local circum-
stances; equitable economic, social,
and cultural development; and pro-
tecting indigenous rights, values, and
traditions. (The last item was added
at the urging of Fiji.) On the one
hand this was an uncontroversial
statement reaffirming principles the
Forum has expounded many times in
the recent past. Yet it also represents
the continuing and uneasy juxtaposi-
tion of democracy and human rights
with the cultural relativist qualifica-
tion that these are subject to interpre-
tation and modification in keeping
with indigenous perspectives. This
will always constitute a tension in the
outlook and deliberations of Forum
members, especially between Austra-
lia–New Zealand and the Forum
island countries. There is a widely
held reluctance among Islanders to
emphasize the upholding of democ-
racy at any cost because it is perc e i v e d
as potentially detrimental to indige-
nous rights, particularly in countries
with major immigrant communities.
For this reason it was difficult to
coordinate strong regional condemna-
tion, much less collective sanctions, in
response to successive coups in Fiji.
In addition, the Biketawa Declara-
tion outlined courses of action to be
pursued in response to an impending
or actual crisis in a member nation. In
consultation with the Forum chair, the
secretary general would assess the sit-
uation and consult national authori-
ties and Forum foreign ministers. The
secretary general would then under-
take one or more actions to resolve a
crisis: prepare a statement by Forum
members, create a ministerial action
group, mount a fact-finding mission,
convene an eminent persons group,
p rovide third - p a rty mediation, support
conflict resolution mechanisms, con-
vene a meeting of the Forum Regional
Security Committee, or ministers,
and, if all of these fail, convene a spe-
cial meeting of Forum leaders to con-
sider unspecified “targeted measures.”
In effect, the Forum proposed a pro-
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cess for responding to crises in mem-
ber nations very similar to that of the
Commonwealth, the United Nations,
and the Africa Caribbean Pacific
group of the European Union,
although the Forum’s plan does not
include explicit reference to punitive
sanctions. Whether the Forum plans
to duplicate actions by other regional
or international organizations,
whether it seeks to supplant them, 
or, if not, how an approach could be
coordinated among such entities with
respect to conflict resolution, remains
unknown.
The deteriorating security situation
in Melanesia was not restricted to 
Fiji and the Solomon Islands. In an
impassioned gesture defying political
reality, indigenous West Papuans
issued a declaration of independence
at their Second Papuan People’s Con-
gress held from 29 May to 4 June in
the territorial capital of Jayapura in
West Papua (Irian Jaya). It was forty
years since the first congress had
declared independence at the time of
Dutch decolonization. Attended by
3,000 people, the congress in 2000
included Melanesian participants fro m
all over the territory as well as repre-
sentatives from the central govern m e n t
and provincial administration, Papuan
leaders living in exile, and supporters
of the guerrilla-based Free Papua
Movement (o p m). The congress
emphatically rejected the 1962 New
York Agreement made by Indonesia,
the Netherlands, and the United
Nations and the subsequent dubious
referendum known as the 1969 Act of
Free Choice that sealed their fate as a
province of Indonesia. They asked
that the United Nations review the
legitimacy of these historic processes
and reinstate West Papua as a non-
self-governing territory on the agenda
of the UN Decolonization Committee.
In discussions of the preferred
political status to be pursued, West
Papuans at the congress were unani-
mously opposed to autonomy or any
form of continued association with
Indonesia. Radical groups called for
immediate independence and the
establishment of a provisional govern-
ment in exile, whereas the moderate
majority favored gradual moves
toward independence through peace-
ful negotiation with Indonesia and
international mediation. The voices 
of moderation won out for the time
being and they predominated in the
Presidium Council, which represents
the nationalist movement and lobbies
for its aims. The congress chose sym-
bols for the new state, including “My
Land Papua” as the national anthem,
the mambruk bird as an emblem,
“New Guinea Golden” as the name
of a new currency, and the Morning
Star as the official flag (P N B, June
2000, 1–2).
West Papuans were inspired and
emboldened because the post-Suharto
Indonesian government had allowed
East Timor to exercise its right to self-
determination in a UN-monitored ref-
erendum and ultimately respected the
outcome, which set the territory on a
transition to independence. They were
given further cause for hope by newly
elected Pre s i d e n t A b d u rr a h m a n Wa h i d ,
who chose to welcome the new mil-
lennium in their territory by making
two unprecedented concessions: rec-
ognizing the name Papua and allow-
ing the nationalist Morning Star flag
to be flown alongside the Indonesian
one. In keeping with his belief in
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human rights, Wahid demonstrated a
willingness to allow public debate in
West Papua over their future political
status within the Republic of Indone-
sia. He therefore gave his approval
for the congress to take place. At this
point Jakarta’s policy of reform, toler-
ance, and cooperation toward West
Papua began to unravel.
Wahid rejected the congress’s dec-
laration of independence saying it was
not in line with understandings he had
reached with the Presidium over the
scope and outcome of the pro c e e d i n g s .
Wahid then proposed to Indonesia’s
national parliament that West Papua
be granted autonomy but not indepen-
dence, and this policy was adopted by
the assembly (m p r) on 8 August.
However, Wahid’s overall liberal
a p p roach was not shared or support e d
by other elements of his government,
such as Vice President Megawati
Sukarnoputri and, perhaps more
important, the armed forces (t n i).
They were no doubt of the view that
any concessions to the nationalists
would merely encourage demands for
independence, and this perception was
to some extent vindicated. Whereas
West Papuans saw the final outcome
in East Timor as a welcome pre c e d e n t ,
the military and other Indonesian
nationalists saw it as the first crack in
Indonesia’s territorial integrity—one
they did not want repeated in West
Papua, Aceh, or anywhere else.
Indonesia’s national interest in
retaining West Papua is clear. The
province accounts for almost one
quarter of Indonesia’s land mass and
is three and a half times bigger than
Java, which is home to 60 percent of
the national population. It is rich in
natural re s o u rces, including vast tracts
of timber. The Freeport mine, which
boasts the world’s largest reserves of
copper, earned $330 million in tax
revenue for Jakarta in 1999 alone.
The terr i t o ry also hosts 9 0 0,0 0 0 t r a n s-
migrants from elsewhere in Indonesia,
who now constitute nearly half the
population of 2.2 million. The same
reasons explain the West Papuans’
determination to cut their ties with
Indonesia, as they have experienced
political, social, and economic mar-
ginalization in their own land.
The armed forces’ response to the
Papuan declaration of independence
was to increase their military presence
in the latter half of the year. Normally
several thousand military personnel
are based in West Papua. In August,
directly after Indonesia’s rejection of
independence, an additional 6,500
were sent to the territory, and later
police mobile brigades were dis-
patched from Jakarta. A new naval
base for 3,0 0 0 marines is also planned
for West Papua. Most ominously, the
armed forces are supporting the cre-
ation of anti-independence militia in
West Papua, such as Satgas Merah
Putih (Red and white task force). 
This development is alarming from 
a human rights perspective, as t n i-
armed anti-independence militia in
East Timor engaged in a campaign of
terror during 1999, causing the death
of at least a thousand people and the
flight of over 200,000 refugees. Pro-
independence activists have formed
their own militia, Satgas Papua, while
o p m guerrillas have been reorganiz-
ing and training, albeit with very few
arms (P N B, Aug 2000, 12).
By October the military was hard-
ening its position that a separatist
movement could not be tolerated in
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the territory, and they reinstituted the
ban on the Morning Star flag thereby
provoking massive unrest and spo-
radic violence by West Papuans. On
the eve of 1 December, when West
Papuans were to celebrate the fortieth
anniversary of their unilateral inde-
pendence declaration, the military
cracked down on the nationalists.
Four leading members of the Presid-
ium Council were arrested on charges
of subversion, including the chairman,
Theys Eluay, while a fifth was arre s t e d
a few days later. For the first time
since the climate of reform began in
1998, the right to hold political rallies
was denied. Detention of the leaders,
who were advocates of a peaceful
campaign for independence, prompted
a backlash against Indonesian author-
ities and settler communities by West
Papuan militants. As the month pro-
gressed the authorities banned inde-
pendence organizations, shut down
their offices, and arrested hundreds of
militants; more people were shot for
raising the banned flag. There were
unconfirmed reports of deaths in cus-
tody. By the end of the year scores of
people had been killed on both sides
of the ethnic divide.
Less than a year after his unprece-
dented political concessions to West
Papua were announced, President
Wahid visited the territory again to
redraw the bounds of the permissible.
He claimed that freedom of speech
would continue but action would be
taken against any attempts to declare
independence. On 31 December he
announced a significant new decentral-
ization policy. Not only West Papua,
but all of Indonesia’s provinces would
be granted self-rule and so allowed to
retain a far greater share of the profits
from the exploitation of natural
resources. The central government
would retain control over areas such
as defense and foreign affairs and
would take a 40 percent share of pro-
vincial tax revenues. Clearly this is an
attempt to pacify Indonesia’s restive
far-flung provinces and keep the
republic intact, yet international agen-
cies have warned that the momentous
policy shift is hasty and ill prepared
(Australian, 1 Jan 2001, 9).
The sea change in the international
community’s attitude to East Timor’s
struggle for self-determination in
1999 fueled hope in West Papua that
their nationalist campaign might also
receive foreign support. By the end of
2000 they had met with a mixed and
somewhat disappointing response.
West Papuans looked to Australia,
because not only had it championed
East Timor’s right to a UN referen-
dum, but it also led peacekeeping
forces in the conflict-ravaged territory.
However, Australia did not view the
West Papuan situation as comparable
to that of East Timor, and instead
maintained that the territory should
remain an integral part of Indonesia.
Foreign Minister Alexander Downer
attempted to justify his country’s pol-
icy by arguing, “This is not a time in
history when we should be starting to
redraw the colonial boundaries . . .
and to redraw those boundaries now
would cause enormous instability. I
believe many, many people would lose
their lives in a situation like that”
(quoted on a b c Radio, p i r , 20 Dec
2000). Papua New Guinea’s policy
echoed that of Australia, despite its
ethnic affinity with fellow Melane-
sians in West Papua. Australia was
keen to repair relations with Indone-
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sia after the diplomatic rift over East
Timor, while Papua New Guinea was
not prepared to risk border tensions
with its giant neighbor.
There were signs of solidarity from
some Pacific microstates, however, as
first Nauru, then Vanuatu and Tuvalu
declared their support for the West
Papuan right to self-determination.
Vanuatu’s Prime Minister Barak Sope
went so far as to raise the issue at the
UN summit in September, where he
condemned the United Nations
actions in the 1960s as a “mockery to
the fundamental principles on human
rights and self-determination” (P N B,
Oct 2000, 1). West Papuans empha-
sized their historic association with
the Pacific Islands, having participated
in the founding of regional bodies
such as the South Pacific Commission
and the Pacific Council of Churches
before Indonesia’s takeover in the
1960s severed such links. A West
Papuan delegation met with Forum
leaders during their annual meeting
where they did attract some support
as reflected in a media statement by
President Tito of Kiribati who said,
“Personally I have great sympathy for
the cause of the West Papuan people,
just on the basis of culture alone”
(P N B, Nov 2000, 6–7).
The Forum’s final communiqué on
West Papua was a milestone, as it was
the first time leaders had issued a
statement on the territory. They
expressed concern about recent vio-
lence and loss of life in West Papua
and called on all parties to resolve
their differences peacefully with
respect for human rights, but stopped
short of giving any support for West
Papuan self-determination. The state-
ment represented a compromise
between those island leaders who
support West Papuan aspirations for
independence and those, like Austra-
lia, who would rather not have had it
on the agenda.
In Bougainville the peace has held
since the ceasefire commenced in 19 9 8
but the search for a lasting political
settlement continued to be stalled by
the fundamental differences over
Bougainville’s ultimate political status
between the central government in
Port Moresby and the Bougainville
People’s Congress (b p c). In December
1999 the congress had presented the
government with a submission outlin-
ing their preferred framework for a
transition to autonomy and later inde-
pendence. The government then coun-
tered in March with their own frame-
work to develop autonomy, which the
congress rejected as full of inconsis-
tencies and backtracking on earlier
commitments. Most important, the
congress argued that Papua New
Guinea, with Australia’s support, is
resisting a transitional process leading
to independence. Moreover, the con-
gress maintained that Papua New
Guinea was not fulfilling obligations
to withdraw military forces from the
island; rather, garrisons in Buka and
Buin had been strengthened (P N B,
March 2000, 1).
Leaders from both sides hailed a
breakthrough as a result of talks held
in September. The Bougainville Peo-
ple’s Congress welcomed the govern-
ment’s agreement to consider constitu-
tional changes that would allow a
referendum to take place, an organic
law on autonomy, and provisions for
Bougainville to adopt its own consti-
tution. For its part, the P N G side
emphasized the need for a plan on
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weapons disposal to be implemented
before the proposed bills on auton-
omy or a referendum could become
law. The Bougainville Revolutionary
Army’s continuing response was that
they refuse to surrender arms until all
the remaining political issues are
resolved, notably a clear commitment
to a deferred referendum. Despite
signs of progress, Papua New Guinea
was still sending conflicting signals.
On the one hand government negotia-
tors (at these and earlier talks) had
seemingly agreed to a process that
would allow a referendum to eventu-
ally take place on Bougainville’s polit-
ical status. On the other, just prior 
to the talks Prime Minister Mekere
Morauta had publicly announced his
opposition to secession or a referen-
dum (P N B, Sept 2000, 1).
It appears that Port Moresby’s
resistance to a referendum prevailed,
with no movement by the central gov-
ernment on the key issues by the end
of the year. The parliament then went
into recess until July 2001 to avoid a
no-confidence vote against the govern-
ment, thus removing any opportunity
to legislate on Bougainville’s future in
the short term. This points to a re l a t e d
obstacle to reaching a political settle-
ment, namely the frequent changes in
government in Papua New Guinea. In
another setback, Sir Michael Somare,
the minister for Bougainville, was
sacked by the prime minister on 19
December over internal political dif-
ferences. As principal government
negotiator, and a person generally
held in high regard by the people of
Bougainville, Somare’s dismissal
diminished prospects for continuity
and progress in the peace talks. The
final negotiations for the year, due to
resume on 27 December, were post-
poned until January (Australian, 20
Dec 2000, 7). In view of ongoing
negotiations and in keeping with the
principle of noninterference, Bougain-
ville was not mentioned in the annual
communiqué by Forum leaders.
As the review of recent conflicts
and Forum deliberations suggests,
there has been a profound shift in
notions of regional security over the
past fifty years. In the aftermath of
World War Two, many Pacific Island
territories were recovering from hos-
tile occupation and from the use of
their land and seas for devastating
battles. This experience was to rein-
force the message conveyed by the
west that the principal threat to secu-
rity was posed by hostile foreign pow-
ers, notably communist states during
the cold war. As a result of such tra-
ditional security preoccupations,
focusing on military threats and the
global strategic balance, in the Pacific
Islands as elsewhere, other important
dimensions of human security were
neglected. (Indeed, in this context,
western powers endeavored to per-
suade Pacific Islanders that hosting
nuclear tests would ultimately enhance
their security.) For an extended period,
the Pacific Islands and their metropoli-
tan overseers were also preoccupied
with the practicalities of decoloniza-
tion and the institution of democratic
forms of government. As the cold war
waned, former colonial powers rein-
vented as aid donors began to empha-
size economic development and good
governance as the key to security in
the region. Unfort u n a t e l y, by this time,
colonial legacies and other long-term
socioeconomic trends had already laid
the seeds for contemporary conflicts.
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Ostensibly, all the principal politi-
cal and security crises in the Pacific
can be explained and understood as
ethnic conflicts. In the 1980s, violence
flared in New Caledonia due to the
conflict between the indigenous Kanak
and the immigrant French settler com-
munities. In West Papua, as in New
Caledonia, ethnonationalism is exac-
erbated because the immigrants’ pres-
ence and privileges are underwritten
by a colonial power. In Fiji in 1987,
and to a lesser extent in 2000, wide-
spread indigenous support for the
coups could be explained by a belief
that the immigrant Indian community
threatened indigenous Fijian interests.
Although the ten-year war in Bougain-
ville was between Melanesians, it
could also be construed as an ethnic
conflict, given the ethnonationalist
ideology of the secessionists who see
themselves as ethnically distinct from
the rest of Papua New Guineans.
Similarly, the conflict in the Solomon
Islands was between fellow Melane-
sians, but the two warring sides ethni-
cally identified with their respective
islands of origin, Malaita and Guadal-
canal.
Nevertheless, to identify the recent
conflicts as inevitable clashes of eth-
nicity is simplistic and offers little by
way of a solution. In the conflicts to
date, the sheer numerical weight of
immigrants alone could have been
enough to cause concern on the part
of the original inhabitants. However,
ethnonationalism was in all cases
mobilized and aggravated by long-
standing grievances over perceived
and actual political, social, and eco-
nomic disparities, both within and
between ethnic groups, and by dis-
putes over the alienation or lease of
land. An exclusive focus on ethnicity
fosters the misleading conclusion that
future conflicts will be restricted to
territories with substantial immigrant
communities. Yet ethnically uniform
microstates are also vulnerable to
political unrest provoked by a range
of socioeconomic and political con-
cerns unless governments take timely
preventative action. No island com-
munity is immune to the ramifications
of urban drift and globalization. For
that reason, as the following analysis
suggests, it does not follow that polit-
ical and security problems will be
restricted to Melanesia.
In New Caledonia the Kanaks were
shifted from the most fertile land onto
reserves where they were left to pur-
sue a marginal “traditional” lifestyle.
By contrast, the French settlers estab-
lished lucrative ranches or nickel
mines, or dominated the modern
economy of the capital. The British
adopted a similar policy in Fiji, with
the supposedly benevolent aim of pre-
serving Fijian culture. The end result
was a dichotomy “between a cash-
and-skills poor though land-rich
indigenous minority and a land-poor
though cash-and-skills-rich migrant
majority” (Tarte, personal communi-
cation 2001). In the Solomon Islands
a combination of colonial policy and
wartime basing decisions saw Guadal-
canal attract a massive influx of peo-
ple from Malaita. They displaced the
traditional landowners and came to
dominate in commerce and politics,
not to mention the police force. In
terms of colonial legacies, two cases
were affected adversely by the arbi-
trary borders drawn up by colonial
powers. West Papua and Bougainville
had both sought independence prior
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to their incorporation into Indonesia
and Papua New Guinea respectively.
Their ethnonationalist predisposition
was later revived and reinforced, in
large part by the capital’s exploitation
of their natural resources and despoli-
ation of the environment. Once again,
their grievances were compounded by
the arrival of skilled immigrants who
dominated the modern economy.
This brief overview demonstrates
that socioeconomic marginalization,
albeit of varying kinds and degrees,
was a major factor in producing the
resentment that in these cases was
directed against the “other” ethnic
group. (Although in Fiji, conflict is
increasingly manifest between groups
within the indigenous community.)
Such practical grievances, complex
and deep rooted as they are, can be
addressed by national governments
with the support of aid donors and of
the regional and international commu-
n i t y. However, such efforts will need
to go well beyond or even require
rethinking of recent aid donor preoc-
cupations with eliminating patron-
client practices, slashing the public
sector, promoting free markets, priva-
tization, and the like. Recent discus-
sions at the Forum and the Forum
Economic Ministers Meeting indicate
an awareness of the need for new
approaches, including greater public
consultation over economic policies
and more attention to insulating com-
munities from the repercussions of
globalization and economic reform.
Due to sensitive cultural connota-
tions, addressing the grievances of tra-
ditional landowners and current occu-
pants of land poses an even greater
public policy challenge. In Fiji, major-
ity indigenous land ownership is pro-
tected under the existing constitution
and a political solution has more to
do with education about such rights
and the negotiation of policies to
enable the productive use of the land
by citizens of all ethnic groups. In
cases where the land was alienated
one or more generations ago, solu-
tions can only be achieved through
government consultation with all
stakeholders. This may include com-
pensation either to the traditional
landowners or to the current occu-
pants if some of the land is returned.
Given the parlous state of many island
economies and government finances,
claims for financial compensation can-
not be too ambitious if they are to be
realized at all. Notwithstanding the
time and cost involved in achieving
such solutions, once other social and
economic problems are ameliorated
and ethnic tensions calmed, the land
issue could become less volatile and
more amenable to a peaceful settle-
ment.
In all the conflicts to date, concerns
also relate to a sense of marginaliza-
tion from political decision-making.
This too could be practically
addressed throughout the Pacific
Islands with civic education and
greater participation at local govern-
ment and grassroots levels. New Cale-
donia, West Papua, Bougainville, and
the Solomon Islands are also explor-
ing various forms of political and eco-
nomic decentralization as a means of
satisfying local desires for greater
autonomy. Nevertheless, it is clear
that indigenous people in the French
and Indonesian territories, and even
in Bougainville, conceive of autonomy
as merely a stage in the long-term
transition to independence. Despite
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the view in Paris, Jakarta, and Port
Moresby (and, generally speaking,
Canberra) that colonial boundaries
should not be redrawn to produce
ever more microstates, it is unlikely
the indigenous people of these terri-
tories will be satisfied until they have
engaged in an act of self-determina-
tion on their political status. Denying
this option could well ensure continu-
ing political instability and further
recourse to violence.
While acknowledging indigenous
concerns over the influence of other
ethnic groups, democracy is arguably
the best existing system of governance
for balancing competing interests and
thereby ensuring the protection of
minorities and cultural diversity. With
regard to the erosion of traditional
culture, globalization poses more of a
challenge than the continuation of
multicultural societies. Apart from
being unrealistic, the alternatives of
disenfranchising nonindigenous com-
munities or expecting them to leave
after generations of residence would
disregard basic human rights. More-
over from a pragmatic perspective,
any government that saw fit to insti-
tute such racist policies would have 
to contend with the enduring conse-
quences of civil unrest, economic
downturn, and diplomatic isolation.
The longer-term grievances
described here have been greatly exac-
erbated by the recourse to terror and
violence during these internal conflicts.
Certainly the proposal flagged at the
Forum to limit weapons in the com-
munity may reduce the scale of vio-
lence in future conflicts. But given the
theft of weapons from security forces
in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, not
to mention the involvement of army
and police personnel in perpetrating
violence, there are grounds for limit-
ing the weapons available to the state
as well. Crocombe has also pointed to
the need to promote greater integrity
on the part of state authorities, not
just the security forces but also the
judiciary and politicians. For if they
do not set an example by respecting
the rule of law, this can hardly be
expected of the wider citizenry. In the
short term all parties to the conflicts
will need to lay down arms and com-
mit themselves to a process of genuine
reconciliation before interethnic rela-
tions can return to a semblance of
normality. Regional peace monitors
and mediators can facilitate this pro-
cess. Only then can attention turn to
the main tasks of rebuilding trust and
envisioning a more inclusive national
identity.
karin von stro k i rc h
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